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THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MASSACHUSETTS GIVES UNMARRIED COUPLES
STANDING TO PETITION TO ADOPT CHILDREN,
BUT IS THIS REALLY AN ENDORSEMENT OF
NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES?
I. INTRODUCTION
While most Americans consider getting married and raising a family among
their fundamental rights, those persons living "non-traditional" lifestyles
consider these "rights" privileges reserved only for those individuals who satisfy
their state's definition of marriage and family.' No state recognizes gay or
lesbian marriages in the same manner as it recognizes heterosexual marriages.2
Although the United States Supreme Court has articulated a Fourteenth
Amendment due process right for heterosexuals to raise children,3 the Court has
remained silent as to whether this protection applies equally to gay men and
lesbians.4 Without legal precedent providing authority for the recognition of gay
and lesbian families with regard to marriage and parenthood, gay and lesbian
partners in many states continue to seek the protections and rights which

' See Julia Frost Davies, Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protectingthe Nontraditional
Family through Second ParentAdoptions, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1060-61 (1995)

(illustrating ways state laws, especially marriage laws treat heterosexuals differently from
gay men and lesbians); Felicia Meyers, Comment, Gay Custody and Adoption: An Unequal

Application of the Law, 14 WHnrTER L. REV. 839, 839 (1993) (recognizing courts'
victimization of gay and lesbian parents by not acknowledging rights afforded heterosexual
parents).
2 Davies, supra note 1, at 1060. Some jurisdictions do allow gay and lesbian lifetime
partners to register their "domestic partnerships" similar to marital registration, but these
partnerships do not provide the same privileges afforded to marriages. See Davies, supra
note 1, at 1060 n.46 (citing Boston's 1993 Family Registration Act permitting gay and
lesbian couples to register but not share health benefits). But see Braschi v. Stahl Assoc.
Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 212-13, 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (1989) (calling cohabitating gay men
"family" because relationship exhibited traditional marriage indicia).
3 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding heterosexual right to bear
and raise children).
' Felicia E. Lucious, Note, Adoption of Tammy: Should Homosexuals Adopt

Children?,21 S.U. L. REV. 171, 171 (1994). The Supreme Court has never extended this
constitutional right to bear and raise children free from unreasonable state interference to
the gay and lesbian population. Id. at 171 n.7.
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heterosexual married couples take for granted.5
Although one state has successfully challenged statutory prohibitions
against gay and lesbian marriages on state constitutional grounds,6 the
now-federally sanctioned state statutory prohibitions on these marriages remain
significant obstacles to gay and lesbian couples who seek the benefits of legal,
as well as social, recognition.' Some states and municipalities have afforded gay
and lesbian couples a few rights on par with those enjoyed by the heterosexual
married population by including them among protected classes under
anti-discrimination laws and by granting gay and lesbian cohabitants familial
status for purposes of employment benefits where one partner is a civil servant."
While some states have afforded gay and lesbian couples a few of the rights
enjoyed by heterosexual married couples, the dual treatment of heterosexuals and

homosexuals by both state and federal government with respect to marriage
perpetuates a legal system hostile to gay and lesbian couples seeking recognition
of their non-traditional families? State statutes which criminalize "gay and
lesbian sodomy" amplify this hostility.'" In order to gain legal familial

- See Lucious, supra note 4, at 179-80 (describing lack of familial status for gay and
lesbian families because Supreme Court applies law unequally).
6 See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsid,grantedin
part, 74 Haw. 645, 875 P.2d 225 (1993) (questioning on state due process grounds
Haaii's marriage statute prohibiting marriages between persons of same sex). On remand,
state of Hawaii was unable to demonstrate that the statutory prohibition against same-sex
marriages furthered a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to avoid
unnecessary infringements on the constitutional rights of the citizens of that state. Id.
7 See 28 U.S.C. ch. 115, § 1738C (1996) (outlining the Defense of Marriage Act).
The Defense of Marriage Act permits any state to deny full faith and credit to out of state
marriages between persons of the same sex. Id. For same sex couples who marry in Hawaii,
for example, this federal statute permits other states to deny the existence of the marriage
thus also denying the legal and social benefits that derive from marriage. The act further
defines marriage under 1 U.S.C. ch. 1 (1996) as between only a man and a woman, and a
spouse as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife. Id.
s See Juliet A. Cox, Comment, JudicialEnforcement ofMoral Imperatives: Is the
Best Interest of the Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain Societal Homogeneity, 59 MO. L.
REV. 775, 790-91 (1994) (citing Cambridge, Massachusetts, among a number of
municipalities affording rights to gay and lesbian couples). The employment benefits of one
partner, such as medical or dental insurance plans, in some states or municipalities may
cover both the employee and his or her partner without the requirement of a marital
relationship between them. Id.
' See Davies,supra note 1, at 1060-61 (citing legislative non-recognition of gay and
lesbian marriages as source of courts' refusal of support).
" See Cox, supra note 8, at 785 (citing criminalization of homosexual sodomy a
contributor to lack of legal recognition of same-sex marriages); see also Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Action B-1 0489, 151 Ariz. 335, 340, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App.
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recognition, some gay men and lesbians have gone so far as to file petitions to
adopt their partners, in the hope of creating some relationship which the law will
recognize." Many of these attempts to create a "family" in the eyes of the law
through so called "adult adoption" have fallen short however since many courts
feel, as one judge2 stated, that the petitions are a "cynical distortion" of the
adoption statute.'
This article traces the evolution of child adoption by gay and lesbian
couples in spite of the legal system's slow recognition of non-traditional families.
It will trace the current status of adoption by gay and lesbian couples at the state
level and the ways in which the practitioner may effectively articulate and

substantiate an adoption petition on behalf of a gay or lesbian petitioner.

II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S TREATMENT OF GAY AND LESBIAN
FAMIlES
A. Custody Cases
Hostility from the legal system toward gay and lesbian parenting first
materialized with regard to custody rights of gay men and lesbians upon
divorce.' 3 A wave of cases concerning the rights of gay or lesbian parents vying

1986) (finding gay and lesbian man per se unfit parent based on statutory proscription of
sodomy). Homosexual sodomy remains criminalized by statute in many states under the
authority of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct
2841 (1986).
" See, e.g., In the Matter of Adult Anonymous 11, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 88 A.D.2d 30
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (granting petition for adoption of 42-year-old man so parties may
"formalize themselves as a family unit for publicly acknowledging their emotional bond and
unifying their property rights. .."); In the Matter of the Adoption of Elizabeth by P.S., 509
N.Y.S.2d 746, 747, 134 Misc. 2d 144, 146 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1986) (approving adoption of
female ten months younger than parent since parent-child relationship existed); In the
Matter of the Adoption ofRobert Paul P, 63 N.Y.2d 233, 237-238,471 N.E.2d 424, 426-27
(N.Y. 1984) (denying gay man's petition to adopt partner because legislature never intended
such adoptions).
12See In the Matter ofAdult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 203, 88 A.D.2d at 38

(Sullivan, J., dissenting) (calling such an adult petition a "cynical distortion" of the
adoption function); see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The
Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 207 (1995)

(explaining that courts routinely construe adoption laws narrowly thereby denying "adult
adoptions" outside statutory scope).
3 See Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 727-28, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985) (denying a
divorced father custody of his child based on his sexual orientation). But see Bezio v.
Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579-80, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980) (rejecting contention
that a determination of parental fitness may be based solely on sexual orientation). See also

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATEADVOCACY

[Vol. II

for custody against their heterosexual spouses has forced many courts to
consider the legal status of non-traditional families.' 4 By forcing courts to

consider and determine custody petitions of such parents, they have achieved a
semblance of familial recognition from some states.'"
A court determination of custody upon divorce entails an analysis of the
best interests of the child involved' 6 This standard is necessarily broad, thereby
taking into account a variety of characteristics of each party vying for custody,
including the morality of each parent.' When making custody determinations,
a court weighs the potential harm of severing a child from a biological parent
with the characteristics of each parent to decide which party can best provide for
the child's needs.'
When considering the relevance of sexual orientation in a custody dispute,
some judges have allowed moral judgment as to the sexual preference of the
parent, rather than parenting skills, to infect the determination of custody.' 9 This
"judicial homophobia," as one author has coined it, becomes the basis for the

Meyers, supra note 1, at 851 (recognizing similar justifications curtailing rights of gay men
and lesbians in custody disputes and adoptions).
14 See Cox, supra note 8, at 785 (recognizing courts are forced to acknowledge
existence of gay and lesbian relationships when determining custody); see, e.g., Bottoms
v. Bottoms, 18 Va. App. 481, 444 S.E.2d 276 (1994), rev'd 249 Va. 410, 457 S.E.2d 102
(1995) (challenging custody rights of a mother whose post-divorce relationship was
lesbian); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983) (challenging custody
of mother on the basis of her lesbian relationship); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891,
894 (S.D. 1992) (restricting visits to a lesbian mother).
' See, e.g., Guinan v. Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (awarding custody to lesbian mother since lesbian behavior does not render
her unfit parent); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 577, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (1980)
(finding lesbian mother fit parent because no evidence of harmful affect on children); In the
Matter of J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974) (holding sexual orientation
unacceptable basis for denying custody rights of gay and lesbian parents).
16 See Cox, supra note 8, at 775n. I (citing applicable standard in custody cases as

"best interest of the child" from Homer J. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the
United States section 19.4 (1988)).
'7 See Cox, supra note 8, at 775 (recognizing morality of parent often adjudicated
by
"behaviors" court deems immoral such as homosexuality).
Cox, supra note 8, at 775.
" See Davies, supra note 1, at 1059-1060 (describing how moral judgments often
affect determination of parental rights in custody and visitation disputes); see also Meyers,
supra note 1, at 840 (citing ways courts approach sexual orientation in custody cases based
on feelings toward homosexuality). Meyers cites one author's term for the injection of moral
judgments in the determination of custody disputes involving gay men and lesbians"judicial homophobia." See Meyers, supra note 1, at 841 (quoting Robert A. Beargie,
Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71, 74 (1988)).

1997]

NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES

custody determination when the judge uses his discretion to give
disproportionate weight to sexual orientation in assessing the morality of a
parent.20 At present, three states allow sexual orientation to create an
irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness for purposes of custody disputes
between parents.2 Courts adopting this "per se" approach cite five factors to
justify their decisions which some believe are unsupported by factual, solid

evidence.'
Other courts reject the irrebuttable presumption in favor of a rebuttable
presumption that the gay or lesbian parent's sexual orientation is not in the best
interests of the child, placing the burden on that parent to prove the absence of
harm to the child from such orientation. 23 The rebuttable presumption implies

" See Cox, supra note 8, at 775 (citing judicial attachment of harm to homosexuality
based on stereotype sacrifices not promotes child's interests).
2 Meyers, supra note 1, at 840; see also Cox, supra note 8, at 792-793 (citing
irrbuttable presumption of unfitness evidencing broad discretion courts have applying best
interests standard). The three states which still use the so-called "per se" approach are
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. See, e.g., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (Lowenstein, J. dissenting) (citing majority's creation of irrebuttable
presumption of parntal unfitness based on sexual orientation unfair); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640
P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982) (finding change of circumstances of mother's commencement
of lesbian relationship sufficient to deny her custody); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App.
194, 198-99, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1987) (holding that proof of detrimental effect of
sexual conduct on child is unnecessary to deny custody). One of these states, Missouri, has
not been so strict in the scrutiny of heterosexual extramarital affairs. See Cox, supra note
6, at 799 (citing Wilhelnsen v. Peck, 743 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) as evidence that
heterosexual extramarital affairs are not so heavily scrutinized by courts). The court in
Wilhelmsen distinguished heterosexual from gay and lesbian couples with the theory that
the heterosexual couples were not so morally offending and antisocial as their alternative
counterparts. Wilhelmsen v. Peck, 743 S.W.2d at 93.
" See Cox, supra note 8, at 794 (listing five factors used by courts to support their
decisions). Courts cite the following five factors to support their decisions:
(1) the adverse effect the parent will have on the child's moral development,
(2) the harassment and ridicule the child might receive from others,
(3) state sodomy laws,
(4) the fear the child might be more likely to be a gay and lesbian if raised
by a gay and lesbian parent, and
(5) the fear that the child is at an increased risk for contracting AIDS.
Id.; see Meyers, supra note 1,at 843 (stating these reasons are supported by
presumptions rather than by factually solid evidence).
23 Meyers, supra note 1,at 840. Meyers uses the "middle ground approach" of
Tennessee to illustrate the rebuttable presumption. Meyers, supra note 1, at 840.; see also
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (restricting visitation of
mother based on anticipated harnftl effects ofmother's sexual orientation on child); Collins
v. Collins, No. 87-238-IL 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 3, 1988) (suggesting that

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATEADVOCACY

[Vol. II

that the presumption itself is in the best interests of the child at the outset.24
Some scholars note that a presumption that gay or lesbian parents are unfit,
though rebuttable, is dependent upon a moral judgment of homosexuality from
which courts should refrain. Authors note that society's own reaction to sexual
orientation is at best mixed and there is only disputed evidence as to whether
such orientation actually does affect the child's welfare.25
More recently, however, many courts, including Massachusetts courts, have
approached the issue of sexual orientation in custody cases by conditioning its
relevance on a correlation between the fitness of the parent and the parent's

sexual orientation.26 The courts adopting the "nexus" test, as some have called
it, recognize the importance of custody decisions made truly in the child's best

interests, without arbitrary presumptions based on societal prejudices.27 The
nature of a custody determination which impacts a child forever necessitates a

careful analysis of the child's interests free from current prejudices against gay

unless lesbian mother "dissolves" her alternative lifestyle, she would sacrifice custody of
child).
See Cox, supra note 8, at 803 (citing reliance of a presumption on its validity, here
that granting custody to homosexual parent does not fulfill child's best interests).
' See id. at 803 (opining reaction to homosexuality is mixed, so court's presumption
against custody to homosexual does not reflect societal consensus).
26 See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (holding
absent evidence correlating mother's parental fitness and sexual orientation, state may not
deny custody). But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, 18 Va. App. 481, 491, 444 S.E.2d 276, 282
(1994) rev'd 249 Va. 410, 457 S.E.2d 102 (1995) (granting third party custody despite
absence of compelling evidence rebutting presumption of lesbian mother's fitness). Courts
adopting this "nexus" approach will not deny custody to a parent without evidence of some
demonstrable harm to the child as a result of the parent's sexual orientation. Meyers, supra
note 1, at 842. Nineteen states currently adopt this test. Cox, supra note 8, at 792.
SSee Cox, supra note 8, at 806 (stating protection of child begins with recognition
of individuality of heritage, regardless of social popularity); see also Meyers, supra note 1,
at 843 (noting courts utilizing nexus approach analyze heterosexual and gay and lesbian
behavior in same manner). The consistency of the nexus approach with respect to sexual
activity, whether gay and lesbian or heterosexual, survives the constitutional challenges to
which the per se and middle ground approaches are vulnerable. See Meyers, supra note 1,
at 846.
The Supreme Court of Alaska refused to allow social stigma against gay men and
lesbians to take the form of "harm" used to deny custody because this stigma is the only
thing separating heterosexuals and gay men and lesbians; since the stigma is not the fault
of gay men and lesbians, courts should not use it to punish them. Lucious, supra note 4, at
181 (paraphrasing argument of highest court in Alaska in S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875,
11 MEDIA L. REP. 2278 (Ala. 1985)).
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men and lesbians.' A careful analysis of the child's interest should focus on the
child rather than on the sexuality of the parent.29
Whether by the states' refusal to recognize same-sex marriages or by the
various approaches in child custody involving gay and lesbians parents, gay men
and lesbians face significant obstacles to parenting and to legal familial
recognition.' This denial of recognition is extraordinary considering that recent
statistics show that somewhere between six and fourteen million children have
at least one gay or lesbian parent and that the primary caretakers of between
eight and ten million children are gay or lesbian.3' Although courts in New York
have found sufficient indicia of marriage among these households for purposes
of the rent control statute and granting custody,32 without full legal and social
recognition of their families, state and federal governments effectively deny
between eight and ten million children the benefits that recognition carries with

2

See Cox, supra note 8, at 792 (noting difference between custody and adoption

cases). For a general definition of the child's best interests, see the Uniform Marriage and
Diorce Act 402 which includes: (1) the wishes of the child's parent as to custody, (2) the
wishes of the child herself as to custody, (3) interaction with any person who may
significantly affect the child's welfare, (4) the adjustment of the child to her surroundings,
(5) the mental and physical health of all involved. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 839 n. 15
(paraphrasing the considerations under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 402 (1987)).
' Lucious, supra note 4, at 177. The general nature of the best interest test, however,
gives courts great discretion to examine a plethora of factors which may potentially affect
the child, which may include a judge giving disproportionate weight to the sexuality of the
petitioner. See Lucious, supra note 4, at 177 (stating general guidelines and courts'
discretion examining relevant factors leaves room to inject personal prejudices). Lucious
goes on to state that unbiased determinations of the child's best interest should prevail
otherwise the decision amounts to discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Lucious,
supra note 4, at 177.
' See Davies, supra note 1, at 1056 (recognizing existence of "substantial
impediments" confronting non-traditional families in search of legal recognition).
"' Barbra Kantrowitz, Gay Families Come Out, NEWSWEEK, November 4, 1996,
at 52 (highlighting estimates that between 6 and 14 million children have at least one gay
parent); see also Cox, supra note 8, at 786n.66 (citing statistics from Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1629 (1989) that three

million gay and lesbian parents are the primary caretakers between eight and ten million

children).
32 See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 312, 543 N.E.2d at 55 (N.Y. 1989) (finding marriage
indicia present in gay partnership so couple is "family" under rent control statute); see also

M.A.B.v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963, 134 Mdisc. 2d 317, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding
stability and exclusivity of gay partnership and its domestic character relevant to custody
determination).
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B. Adoption

In the last twenty years lesbian and gay couples have pierced through the
barriers to parenting by becoming part of the evolving national dialogue
regarding adoption through both second-parent and traditional adoptions. 4 The
nuclear family consisting of a mother, a father, and their children is still the
exclusive "traditional" family unit.35 Just as it has impeded their ability to retain
custody of their children, the vagueness of the best interest of the child standard,
utilized in both custody and adoption contexts, has given the courts and agencies
in some states the discretion to impede the ability of gay men and lesbians to

adopt children.3
With little case authority with respect to adoptions by gay and lesbian
couples, courts have relied on custody precedent for guidance because providing

for the welfare of the child is the implied statutory purpose of most adoption
statutes as it is in the custody context. 37 Adoption, unlike custody however, is
a creature of statute.'

In addition to the need for a trial court finding the best

interests of the child served through a grant of the petition, adoption also
requires that the petitioner has standing to adopt and that the petitioner falls

' See supra, note 8, and accompanying text (citing a number of benefits which legal
recognition promises).
' See Elovitz, supra note 12, at 207 (discussing how gay and lesbian couples become
parents through second parent and traditional adoption petitions).
' Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 897 (1984). "The uncertain legal status of gay parents is indicative of an attempt to
maintain the fiction of traditional family integrity and homogeneity." Meyers, supra note
1, at 839; cf In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. at 631, 632 A.2d at 554
(1993) (recognizing that families "differ in both size and shape"). "We cannot continue to
pretend that there is one formula... that should constitute a family in order to achieve the
... environment we believe children should inhabit." In re J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super at 631,
632 A.2d at 554-55 (Freeman, J.).
3 See Meyers, supra note 1, at 851 (indicating best interests test has similar effects
in adoption and custody settings based on judicial discretion). Meyers cites the dubious
status of gay and lesbian rights in some jurisdictions which gives rise to a judicial denial
of the opportunity to adopt under the guise of the best interests test just as in custody cases.
Id. at 853.
"' See Lucious, supra note 4, at 181 (stating absence of case authority regarding
adoption leaves courts to rely on custody for guidance).
' Davis v. McGraw, 206 Mass. 294, 297, 92 N.E. 332 (1910).
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within the jurisdictional parameters of the adoption statute. 9
As a practical matter, the failure of states to recognize gay and lesbian
marriages serves as a jurisdictional bar to adoption because the language of
many adoption statutes precludes dual petitions by unmarried couples.' Two
other states, Florida and New Hampshire, statutorily proscribe adoptions by gay
and lesbian couples."' As one author notes, "a per se rule [against gay and
lesbian adoption] is remarkable because the central tenet of adoption is serving
the best interests of the child; therefore, it is rare to have laws that exclude entire
' Prohibitions on marriage
groups from being adoptive parents."42
and adoption
by state legislatures make it extremely hard, if not impossible, for gay and
lesbian couples to realize the opportunity to raise a family and reap the benefits
of legal recognition of that family.4
Alternatives to adoption, such as testamentary guardianship, currently do
not fill the void of establishment of a parent-child relationship with the benefits
of full recognition." Adoption is an alternative for persons who wish to create

' See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 217, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (1993) (concluding
petition in child's best interest gives Probate Court jurisdiction to entertain petition of
unmarried couple).

' See Davies, supra note 1, at 1060 (recognizing non-recognition of gay and lesbian

marriages precludes them from fitting within adoption statutory guidelines). Some adoption
statutes refer only to adoption by a person (with consent of spouse on the presumption that
the petitioner is married to the natural parent) in the case of step-parent adoption, or of
adoption by married couples. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1 (1995) (providing person of
majority may petition or if married must join spouse).
41 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3XWest 1985) (statutorily prohibiting adoption by
gay and lesbian couples); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1990) (allowing adoptions only
by an individual not a minor and not a gay man or a lesbian).
42 Elovitz, supra note 12, at 209. Elovitz also cites the rational basis test under Heller
v. Doe, _ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993), as a means for striking these statutes since
they bear no rational basis to an important governmental interest. Elovitz at 209. But see
In re Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 290, 297, 525 A.2d 1095, 1099-1100 (N.H. 1987)
(per curiam) (citing correlation between parental sexual orientation and child's orientation
upholding adoption statute under rational basis).
' See Suzanne Bryant, Second ParentAdoption: A Model Brief, 2 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POLY 233, 239 (1995) From the recognition of spousal and parent/child relationships
flow legal rights which afford benefits to those who hold them. Such benefits for the child
include inheritance and other financial benefits such as health insurance. Id.
' See Meyers, supra note 1, at 854 (citing the California alternatives to adoption).
Using adoption alternatives used in California, Meyers indicates their inadequacies, starting
with the alternative which entails the appointment of a co-parent as testamentary guardian.
Meyers, supra note 1, at 854. The second alternative is the claiming of rights under either
de facto parent, equitable parent, or parent standing in loco parentis. Meyers, supra note
1, at 854. De facto parent is non-statutory, however, and does not afford the same rights of
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a full legal relationship with a child, but who cannot or who decide against
bearing children of their own.45

III. IN RE TAMMY
A. Overview
Gay and lesbian couples have begun to realize the benefits of full legal
recognition after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the second
appellate court to begin removing the barriers to parenthood.4 6 The In re Tammy
court liberally interpreted the Massachusetts adoption statute to allow a
biological mother to retain her parental rights while granting her lesbian partner's
petition for adoption of the child. 47 Because the biological mother retained her
rights, the Tammy decision concerned a "second-parent" adoption. 4' A second
parent adoption involves adoption by the legal parent's non-marital partner
without termination of the rights or responsibilities of the legal parent. 49 Most

and parent standing in loco parentis has not yet been extended to same-sex parents. Id.
45 See Lucious, supra note 4, at 171. Same sex couples fall within the group who
physically cannot bear children with a legal tie to both mothers or to both fathers. Even
with the options of foster parentism, surrogacy, artificial insemination, or children from
previous marriages, "other parents" must rely on adoption in order to create the legally
binding relationship complete with the benefits accruing therefrom. Id. at 173.
46 In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 217,617 N.E.2d 315, 322 (1993). Vermont was the
first state supreme court to allow a lesbian mother to adopt her partner's biological child
without termination of the rights of the biological mother in Adoptions of B.L.V.B. &
E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368,628 A.2d 1271 (1993). Only Massachusetts and Vermont "provide
mandatory authority for coparental legal rights in lesbian relationships." Davies, supra note
1, at 1055. Many lower courts in other jurisdictions have also granted such petitions. See
In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. at 632, 632 A.2d at 555
(1993) (granting adoption petition of biological mother's life partner upon finding partner
is "cornerstone" of home); In the Matter of the Adoption of Caitlin and Another, 622
N.Y.S.2d 835, 163 Misc. 2d 999 (1994) (granting petition of biological mother's life partner
upon finding nurturing family environment). But see Elovitz, supra note 12, at 208 (noting
many courts have interpreted adoption statutes narrowly prohibiting second parent
adoptions).
47 See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 217, 619 N.E.2d at 322 (upholding a dual petition
for adoption by biological mother's life partner and the biological mother).
4 See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 206-207, 619 N.E.2d at 316-17 (stating Susan is
mother consenting to Helen's petition on condition she not lose parental rights).
41 See Bryant, supra note 43, at 233 (defining second parent adoptions as adoption
by legal parent's non-marital partner); see also Elovitz, supra note 12, at 207 (defining
second parent adoption as means of creating "a second legally recognized parent for child").
Bryant describes second parent adoptions as a "natural extension of step-parent adoptions"
because in both cases the legal parent desires to provide stability for the child by creating
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courts granting second parent adoptions have premised their decision on the
benefits to the child in having legal ties to both caretakers, rather than a legal tie
to the biological mother alone.' Although adoptions by gay and lesbian couples
received considerable support from the recent In re Tammy decision, the
significance of the case will ultimately depend on its precedential value for cases
involving gay and lesbian couples who seek to begin a family through adoption
with no biological tie."
B. Backgroundon Adoption in Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, the primary authority for adoption cases involving gay
52 and the adoption statute.53 Although
and lesbian couples is Bezio v. Patenaude
a custody decision, Bezio provides mandatory authority for the analysis of the
best interest of a child where the sexual orientation of the parent is involved.54

because in both cases the legal parent desires to provide stability for the child by creating
a second legal parent for the child while retaining his/her own rights. Bryant at 233; cf In
re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 217, 619 N.E.2d at 321 (concluding if petition in child's best
interests, court will enter a decree on a joint petition for adoption).
' See Elovitz, supra note 12, at 208 (finding common in decisions granting second
parent adoptions benefit of legal ties to both caretakers). But see In re Angela Lace, 184
Wis.2d 492, 518, 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (1994) (denying a second parent adoption
petition). Such denials of second parent petitions cause harsh consequences for the parent
who remains without a biological tie, but who has cared for the child since birth as if a
"parent" though not in the eyes of the law. Elovitz, supra note 12, at 209. Such
consequences include a denial of visitation and custody rights on divorce or death of the
biological parent. Id.; see Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 841, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 219 (1991) (holding partner of biological mother did not qualify as parent for
visitation when couple separated).
5' See InreTammy, 416 Mass. 205, 207, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315-16 (1993) (involving
adoption petition of two lesbian partners, one of whom was biological mother of the child).
The court did not address the situation where two unmarried people, whether gay or lesbian
or otherwise, seek to begin a family by adoption. Id.; cf.Elovitz, supra note 12, at 207
(indicating two ways adoption affects gay and lesbian people are second parent and
traditional adoptions).
32 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
53 See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 210-16, 619 N.E.2d at 317-21 (using adoption

statutory language to hold unmarried individual may adopt without terminating biological
mother's rights); see also Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216
(holding best interests of child and parental fitness predicated on behavior adversely
affecting child).
s' See Bezio, 381 Mass. at 576-79, 410 N.E.2d at 1214-16 (combining parental
fitness and best interest tests holding they require evidence of adverse affect on child). The
Supreme Judicial Court refused to allow the State to deprive parents of custody because
their household environments fail to "embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with
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The adoption statute provides jurisdictional authority for the standing of a
petitioner to adopt a child, that is, whether the petitioner is eligible to adopt." In
In re Tammy, the Supreme Judicial Court liberally interpreted the adoption
statute's jurisdictional requirements in order to promote the statute's best interest
of the child purpose.' The Supreme Judicial Court approved a dual petition by
two unmarried, same-sex cohabitants, one of whom was the child's biological

mother because the trial court had found that a grant of the petition would
ultimately promote the best interest of Tammy. 7
C Holding

The decision in In re Tammy rests on a finding by the trial court that a grant
of the petition would serve the best interests of the child.5' Once the trial court
found that a grant of the petition promoted the statutory purpose, the Supreme
Judicial Court sought to find a way through the language of the adoption statute
to allow two unmarried persons, one of whom was child's biological mother,
standing to adopt.5 9 The Supreme Judicial Court found authority for the

the average." Id. at 579.
" See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1 (1996) (providing list of eligible petitioners in
adoption proceeding).
5' See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 210-12, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-20 (1993)
(concluding though not expressly named eligible petitioners, unmarried couple may petition
since promotes statute's purpose). This liberal construction finds authority from a
legislatively mandated rule that "words importing the singular may extend and be applied
to several persons" so long as not inconsistent with the intent of the statute and the context
of the statute. Id. at 212, 619 N.E.2d at 320.
s Id.
at 217, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
5' See id. (stating trial court's finding that the adoption in best interest of child).
Based on home study conducted by the Department of Social Services and the findings of

a court-appointed Guardian ad Litem who considered outside social science evidence and
the specific evidence of this case in his report, the Probate Court found that granting the
petition served Tammy's best interests. Id. at 206, 209-210, 619 N.E.2d at 315, 317. The

court determines the best interests of the child by looking at all of the facts surrounding the
welfare of the child and the abilities of the parents to provide for the child. See MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 210, § 3(c) (1992) (listing factors in assessing best interests of child). The lower

Probate Court found the best interests of Tammy served through a grant of the petition
largely in light of the biological relationship to one mother and the nurturing, caring
relationship since birth to the other mother. See In re Tammy 416 Mass. at 206, 619 N.E.2d
at 315.
51 See In re Tammy 416 Mass. at 210, 619 N.E.2d at 317 (using principles of
statutory construction as authority for standing of petitioners). In In re Tammy the Supreme
Judicial Court had the luxury of interpreting the adoption statute with a record from the
lower probate court that the best interests of this child would be promoted with the grant
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standing of the petitioners to adopt, by statutory construction relying on the
purpose of the statute.'
In In re Tammy, the Supreme Judicial Court considered a second parent
adoption petition filed by two unmarried women. 6' Faced with the dual petition
and the unmarried status of the petitioners, the court determined that the ultimate
issue in this case was whether the petitioners had standing to adopt under the
language of the statute.62 The court found that nothing in the statutory language
precluded the petition and that the petitioners met all of the statutory
preconditions.63 Furthermore, because the biological mother was a party to the
joint adoption petition, the court also concluded that her parental rights need not

of the petition. See id.(holding despite trial court's determination that petition in child's
best interests, question ofjurisdiction remains). On the record before it, then, the Supreme
Judicial Court needed only to interpret the adoption statute in a way which would promote
this purpose. Id. The best interests of the child thus became the prerequisite for such an
interpretation.
',See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 206, 619 N.E.2d at 315 (describing petitioners as
two unmarried women).
61 In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 206, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315 (1993). The two women

have been physicians in a committal relationship with each other for over ten years. Id.
Since Massachusetts doesnlt recognize gay and lesbian marriages, they have never married.
Id. Through artificial insemination, the women conceived a child whose father relinquished
his parental rights (he is the cousin of the non-biological mother). Id. The biological mother
consented to the adoption by her partner. Id.
62 In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 210, 619 N.E.2d at 317-18. The court recognized that
since adoption is a creature of statute under Davis v. McGraw, 206 Mass. 294, 297 (1910),
the statute itself must allow such a petition. Id; see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210 (1992). The
primary purpose of the statute was to advance the child's best interests. In re Tammy, 416
Mass. at 210, 619 N.E.2d at 317-18. The court interpreted the statute's ambiguities to allow
the petition that the Probate Court adjudicated to be in the child's best interest. See id.
(citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, §§ 3, 4A, 5A, 5B,6 and Adoption of a Minor, 343 Mass.

292,294-96, 178 N.E.2d 264, 265-66 which calls best interests of child primary principle
governing adoption or custody).
'3 Inre Tammy, 416 Mass. at 210-11,619 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch.
210, § 1). The statute states "(a) person of full age may petition the probate court.. . and
doesn't expressly preclude joinder by another person. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1. The
statute does not expressly exclude two unmarried people from filing a petition. In re
Tammy, 416 Mass. at 211-12, 619 N.E.2d at 318-19 (excluding specifically classes of
people with no standing to adopt). The court noted that before a decree of adoption may be

entered, one of five preconditions under G. L. c. 210, § 2A must be satisfied. Id. at 212-13,
619 N.E.2d 319-20. Since the Department of Social Services approved the petition in
writing and since Tammy was a blood relative of the adoptive parents, the petition satisfied

two of the preconditions. Id.
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terminate on entry of the adoption decree.'
In a 4-3 decision, the majority upheld the dual petition since both the
legislative intent and the statutory language also supported such a construction.6'
The legislative intent as articulated by the court, evinces the goal of adoption to
be the promotion of the best interests of the child. Since the trial court found
those interests served in this case the Supreme Judicial Court subsequently found
support for the plural construction.' Although recognizing that the legislature
probably did not specifically envision such a petition when it enacted the statute,
the court also found that the legislature's use of general language to define those
who could adopt did evince an intent to promote a variety of petitions.67 The
legislature's careful definition of those persons who could not adopt fulfilled the
context piece of the construction requirement.s The legislature's failure to
expressly prohibit a petition by two unmarried individuals thus opened the door
to a construction allowing the petition in this case.69 Having satisfied the
legislative intent and context requirements of the rules of construction, the court
concluded that so long as the decree serves the child's best interests, the Probate
Court has jurisdiction to grant a joint adoption petition by unmarried persons
without the termination of the natural parent petitioner's legal relationship to the
child.7"

64 In're Tanmy, 416 Mass. at 217, 619 N.E.2d at 321. The court concluded that the

legislature did not intend termination of the natural mother's rights if she is a party to the
adoption petition. Id. Once again, the court relied on the best interests analysis in
intaxting the statute to allow Tammy's natural mother to retain her parental rights. Id. at
216,619 N.E.2d at 321.
's In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 216, 619.N.E.2d at 321 (4-3 decision). The courts
reasoning relied on a rule of construction which supports the inclusion of a plural "persons"
in the statute, although the statute only defines a "person" as one with standing to adopt.
Id. The court could embrace such a construction could only if the legislative intent and the
context of the language also supported such a construction. Id.; MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4, § 6
(1992) states "words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several
persons unless the resulting construction is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
law-making body or repugnant to the test of the same statute."
In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 211-12, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319-19 (1993).
6 In re Tammy, 416 Mass. at 212,619 N.E.2d at 319.
"Id.
69Id.

" Inre Tammy, 416 Mass. at 217, 619 N.E.2d at 321. ButseeId. at 217-18 (Lynch,
J., dissenting) (seeking accommodation of child's best interests without "doing violence to
the statute" by accepting a single petition with rights retained by mother). Here Justice

Lynch, while carefully disavowing any stance on the sexual preferences of the petitioners,
seems to want to prevent dual petitions by unmarried couples so as to preclude gay and
lesbian couples from beginning a family through adoption. Though he never specifically
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IV. THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD WHERE GAY AND LESBIAN
PARTNERS SEEK TO BEGIN A FAMILY THROUGH ADOPTION

With this jurisdictional victory for dual adoption petitions by unmarried
couples in Massachusetts, the previous marriage preclusion of gay and lesbian
and even some heterosexual couples in the area of adoption has largely been
negated. 7' The best interests of the child prerequisite, however, remains a
formidable hurdle for the practitioner who seeks to pursue a petition on behalf
of such couples who wish to begin a family through adoption.72 In In re Tammy,
the biological tie and the benefits to the child through grant of the decree gave
the trial court considerable leave to find the welfare of the child promoted under
the circumstances.7" Just as it has proven for custody cases from which it
evolved, the best interests test still has the potential to circumvent the support
for non-traditional families in Massachusetts by allowing courts to give
disproportionate weight to sexual orientation in petitions involving parties who

states such an intention, the effect of his interpretation would continue the preclusion of gay
and lesbian couples from adopting children which are not so-called second parent
adoptions.
"' Elovitz, supra note 12, at 236. Other states, such as New York have followed the
model of the highest courts in Vermont and Massachusetts by granting second-parent
petitions. See In re Jacob and Dana, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. Ct. App. Nov.
2, 1995). The analysis in In re Tammy logically extends to heterosexual unmarried couples
who choose not to many and want to establish paternity or maternity. Elovitz, supra note
14, at 236.
' See Elovitz, supra note 12, at 210 (stating many states find lesbians and gay men
do not meet criteria for adoptive parents). The Arizona Court of Appeals allowed an
adoption agency to consider sexual orientation of the adoptive parent in finding him unfit
to adopt. See Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 340, 727
P.2d 830, 835 (1986) (finding gay man per se unfit parent based on statutory proscription
of homosexual sodomy). Elovitz also notes agency preclusions to adoptive opportunities
for lesbian and gay people based on pretextual factors. Elovitz, supra note 12, at 210.
Despite the fact that he finds the fears surrounding child rearing by gay men and lesbians
to be groundless based on social science research, Elovitz cites courts which have responded
to the research by upholding the bans on gay and lesbian adoptions. Elovitz, supra note 12,
at 210.
73 See In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 206, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993); see also Bryant,
supra note 43, at 234 (confirming second parent adoptions are in child's best interest since
"they stabilize the existing family unit and provide the child with numerous legal,
psychological, and economic benefits"). Bryant cites such advantages as legal parent-child
relationships, stable custody plans, and inheritance among the advantages for a child where
a second parent adoption has been granted. Bryant, supra note 43, at 234.
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have no biological tie to the child. 4 In assessing the welfare of the child, some
courts allow a thorough consideration of all of the facts which may affect the
child, including the effects of marital status and non-marital relationships."
Other courts allow a consideration of sexual orientation only if the opposing
party can prove some specific adverse impact to the child's welfare.76
The discretionary nature of the best interests test gives judges the
opportunity to inject their own views on sexual orientation and block petitions.
The lack of predictability in the application of the best interests of the child
standard makes it difficult to determine how the court will address future cases
that do not involve second parent adoptions." Without a record from the trial
court that the petition was in the best interest of the child, the Supreme Judicial
Court in In re Tammy likely would not have interpreted the adoption statute as
it did. The question remains whether the construction of the adoption statute can

also support a petition by unmarried individuals with no prior contact with the
child.
Most cases where courts have granted gay men and lesbians the opportunity

to adopt a child with which they have no biological connection have occurred
only where the child was difficult to place.'" A recent District of Columbia case,

'7 See In re Adoption of Charles B, 50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 90, 552 N.E.2d 884, 886
(1990) (holding "adoption matters must be decided on a case-by-case basis through the able
exercise of discretion by the trial court giving due consideration to all known factors" in
determining best interest of child). Only abuses in discretion will be overturned on review.
Id.

"' See Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. App. 1977) (considering mother's
heterosexual adulterous relationship exposed to child which rendered her unfit parent for
custody).
76 See Bezio v. Palenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980)
(refusing sexual orientation as factor in assessing custody unless it adversely affects child);
see also In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. at 628-29, 632
A.2d at 553 (1993) (citing the holding of In re J.S.C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 489 (Ch. Div.
1974) that parental custody rights "cannot be denied, limited, or abridged on the basis of
sexual orientation" unless adverse affect on child). New Jersey applied the best interests
standard in custody matters to adoption petitions to conclude that sexual orientation would'
be nothing more than a factor in its decision. In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by
J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. at 628, 632 A.2d at 553.
" See supra, note 49 and accompanying text. The requirement for the child's best
interests as a prerequisite for the decree could become a significant obstacle to those
families who have no biological tie to the child to be adopted. Many courts, especially lower
courts, have granted such second parent adoption petitions on a finding that the petitions
promote the child's welfare. See supra, note 49.
78 See Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 888 (granting adoption
petition of bisexual psychological counselor to adopt a special needs child); see also Glover
v. Glover, 66 Ohio App. 3d 724, 732-33, 586 N.E.2d 159, 164-65 (1990) (limiting Charles
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however, did allow two gay men to begin a family by adoption through a second
parent adoption where one of the men had already adopted the child and the
couple had established a family unit with the child.79 Although a few gay and
lesbian partners have begun families through adoption, the circumstances in
those cases have been exceptional, making the future of such petitions
questionable.
Because statutory interpretation necessarily depends on whether granting
the adoption petition is in the best interests of the child, unmarried gay and
lesbian couples potentially face a considerable obstacle to adoption. Thus far,
courts that allow second-parent adoptions have relied on the legislative purpose
of protecting the welfare of the child to guide their interpretation of adoption
statutes to include dual petitions by a biological parent and partner while
retaining the rights of the biological parent.80 When a gay or lesbian couple
seeks to adopt a child together, without a biological and legal tie, the analysis
changes because the petition is a dual petition by two people neither of which
have a legal tie to the child. When neither petitioner holds such a legal or
biological tie to the child, the best interests test can address only contingencies
of potential benefits upon grant of the petition, rather than realities of current
and future benefits based on an established relationship.
The best interests test ideally involves a factually-specific analysis of every
adoptee's situation and the adoptive parent's ability to provide and care for the
child without regard to sexual orientation. The discretionary nature of the test,
however, leaves room for courts to ensure continued support for traditional
families while denying that support for non-traditional families."' The threat of

B. to situations where child is hard to place). But see Cox v. Fla. Dept. of Health and
Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (1995) (refusing to strike Florida adoption statue
prohibiting homosexual adoption so gay men could adopt special needs child).
" In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995). After placing an ad in the
newspaper, the two men received an answer from a woman willing to allow them to adopt
her soon-to-be-born child. Id. One of the men, Bruce, filed the first adoption petition, and

adopted Hillary soon after, although both men take equal parts in her care. Id. The two men
together then petitioned, with Bruce's consent to adopt Hillary in order to create a legal
relationship with each of them which the D.C. court granted. Id.
But cf In re Jason C., 129 N.H. 762, 764, 533 A.2d 32, 33 (N.H. 1987) (Souter,
J.) (articulating statuto purpose to be encouragement of traditional family structures which
provide stability); accordAdoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1982)

(Domengeaux, J. concurring).
*"See Davies, supra note 1, at 1059 (stating moral judgments such as those espoused
in Bowers v. Hartwick,478 U.S. 186 (1986) often affect determination of best interests of
child in custody cases); see, e.g., Beck v. B&ek, 341 So.2d 589, 582 (La. App. 1977)
(allowing court's moral principles to invade when mother living in non-marital relationship
is deemed unfit); Roev. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 726, 324 S.E.2d 691,693 (1985) (recognizing
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denial of petitions based solely on sexual orientation is ever present because
moral judgments may always underlie seemingly sound legal doctrine."' A
requirement that the opposer of the petition prove that the petitioner's sexual
orientation has some specific impact on the child removes this discretion and
undermines the ability to give disproportionate weight to sexual orientation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has at least opened the door

to dual petitions by unmarried couples so long as the petitioner can prove that
a grant of the petition promotes the child's welfare. 3 In Massachusetts, the court
determines the best interests of the child by considering "all factors relevant to
the physical, mental, and moral health of the child" as well as the ability of the
adopting party to "bring up the child and provide suitable support and education
for it."" One of those factors may include the sexual orientation of the adoptive
parent if raised by those opposing to petition. If those in opposition do raise
sexual orientation as a factor, the legal practitioner must support the petition by
articulating that the child has not received and will not receive any adverse

father as a fit parent, but his sexual orientation flies in the face of society's mores); Chicoine
v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1992) (remanding trial court decision which
restricted a lesbian mother's visitation rights); but see Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852
P.2d 44 (1993) (stating that judge can't be ultimate authorities on Divine Will); Bezio v.
Patenaude, 318 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980) (holding mother's
lesbianism may be considered only if clear nexus with her fitness as parent); Guinan v.
Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 830, 831 (1984) (allowing sexual
orientation to become factor only upon showing it adversely affects welfare of child).
82 See Elovitz, supra note 12, at 209 (citing courts' discretionary powers and
unfounded stereotypes as sources of second parent adoption denials). Elovitz also cites the
judicial manipulation of social science research as flawed or irrelevant since it has yet to
show any harm to a child from the gay and lesbian status of a parent. Elovitz, supra note 12,
at 216-17. Courts denying these adoptions cite the lack of understanding of homosexuality
and the belief that it is a result of genetic and environmental factors to support their claims.
Elovitz, supra note 12, at 216-17 (citing In Re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H.
1987)). These assumptions while devastating in child custody cases, are worse in adoptions
because there is no prior legal relationship between the child and the adoptive parent.
Elovitz, supra note 12, at 224. Because of the lack of prior legal relationship, great
deference is given to the courts' and the social workers' definitions of ideal parents. Elovitz,
supra note 12, at 224; see also Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting,22 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 1009 (citing lingering ofjudicial preconceptions in adoption law well beyond that of
custody).
' In re Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993).
I See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 3(a); see also In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837
(D.C. 1995) (citing Washington, D.C. and Massachusetts as recognizing non-standard
families which could be in a child's best interest under the adoption statute).
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effects from such orientation. 5 Unlike custody cases where the parent is
presumed fit, the burden in adoption proceedings involving gay and lesbian
petitioners is on the prospective parent to demonstrate that their sexual
86
orientation will not harm the child.
The difficulty arises where the adoptive parents, as in most cases, have not
had any contact with the child before the petition. 7 In these cases, the court
must rely on a Social Services home-study or other such evaluation of the home
environment provided by the adoptive parents.8 8 At least one commentator has
suggested that stories about the everyday lives of gay men and lesbians provide
valuable insight into what the court can expect for the child on granting the
petition.8 Some courts have cited evidence as to the commitment of the gay and
lesbian partners and the permanency of their relationship in order to grant

" See, e.g., Fort v.Fort, 12 Mass. App. Ct 411, 418-19, 425 N.E.2d 754, 759 (1981)

(holding father's illegal heterosexual relationship does not per se prevent him custody absent
affect on child); Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 767-770 (1983) (stressing parent's
lifestyle, standing alone not sufficient to sever natural bond between parent and child);
Bezio, 381 Mass. at 579, 410 N.E.2d at 1216 (refusing to allow lifestyle alone to determine
child's custody from parental fitness). The author Bryant cites the broad discretion courts
enjoy in granting adoptions based on the paramount best interests of the child consideration.
Bryant, supranote 43, at 236. Specific evidence of adverse affects of homosexuality, rather
than general societal discrimination are needed to support an finding of unfitness. See
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (refusing to allow general societal racial
prejudices to dictate the custody of a child).
6 See Lucious, supra note 4, at 191-92n. 151. A party in opposition must still prove
an adverse affect on the child. Lucious, supra note 4, at 192 n. 152.
87 Elovitz, supra note 12, at 209. Any contact with a child pre-adoption is generally
minimal in the cases of gay and lesbian couples since many states' social services agencies
preclude gay men and lesbians as foster parents in their policy, including Massachusetts.
However, many times such partners will lie about their sexual orientation in order to be
given the opportunity to become a foster parent and then an adoptive parent. Elovitz, supra
note 12, at 209.
" See In re Tammy 416 Mass. 205, 209, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1993) (citing
Department of Social Service home study as source of evidence of home environment).
" See Marc. A.Fajer, Can Two Men Really Eat Quiche Together?, U. MIAMI L. REV.

511, 514 (1992) (suggesting telling stories about gay and lesbian lives is essential to
litigation involving homosexuals). But cf.In re Angela Lace, 184 Wis. 2d at 518, 516
N.W.2d at 686 (refusing to grant adoption petition of lesbian partner because couple is
unmarried). The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not consider the indicia of marriage
between the two parties nor their commitment to each other in deciding that the mother's
lesbian partner could not adopt the child. Id.
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custody or adoption.9 Most courts also look at the ability of the petitioners to
provide for the child, financially.91 Generally, however, all courts granting these
petitions primarily look to the petitioner's commitment to the child.92
The practitioner may also wish to put the state to its test by demanding that
it put forth specific evidence of the adverse affects of the adoptive parents'
sexual preferences on the child while reminding the court of the
unconstitutionality of relying on general societal prejudices to determine
placement.9' A recent custody case from New York involving a gay father found
that even the boy's difficulty in accepting his father's sexual orientation would
not preclude the father's custody on the belief that the child will eventually be

required to integrate that fact into his life. 4 Still another approach has been
cited by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as true to the legislative
intent of all adoption statutes.9" According to the Appeals Court, the best
interest of the child goal of the adoption statute necessarily includes providing
the child a permanent loving home.' Since there is not a suitable single person
or married couple available to adopt every child who lacks a permanent home,
the court found it absurd to limit the class of people eligible to adopt to just

See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (citing five-year
relationship of two gay men when granting their adoption petition); Matter of Caitlin, 163
Misc. 2d 999, 622 N.Y. S.2d 835 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1994) (considering nine-year cohabiting
lesbian partners' property co-ownership and relationships with each's family in granting
adoption); In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. at 624, 632
A.2d at 551 (1993) (citing ten-year committed relationship between mother and partner
evidence to grant second parent petition).
" See, e.g., In the Matter of Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844, 846, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y.
Surr. Ct. 1992) (citing security afforded a child in a second parent adopted child based on
support obligation, inheritance, and social security entitlements); In re Tammy, 416 Mass.
at 207, 619 N.E.2d at 316-17 (noting potential inheritance from Helen, non-biological
mother, and careers as physicians providing financial stability); Matter of Caitlin, 163 Misc.
2d 999, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994) (recognizing large home of mothers in
excellent repair located in quiet suburban neighborhood with families).
92 See Matter of Caitlin, 163 Misc. 2d at 999, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (calling the
petitioners "intelligent, stable, mature women... who have carefully considered their
relationship and how they can be the best kind of parents. . ."); see also In re M.M.D., 662
A.2d at 837 (recognizing Hillarys bonding to both men equally and their equal sharing of
her care and nurturing).
" See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding reliance on societal prejudice
in the context of custody is unconstitutional).
94 M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 134 Misc. 2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
9' In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. App. 1995).
90
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single and married persons.97 The court focussed on the best interests of the
child with regard to how she would best thrive, rather than on the family
structure.9 The court found sexual orientation of the adoptive parents a
consideration under the best interests of the child only where relevant to specific
harm to the child.'
In Massachusetts, although the state may not deprive parents of custody of
their children simply because their "households fail to meet the ideals approved
by the community ... or embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the
average," evidence suggesting a correlation between sexual orientation and
fitness as a parent is admissible."e The admissibility of this type of evidence
based on a correlation alone provides little guidance to the discretion of a judge
who determines parental fitness and the best interests of the child. 10 1 The finality
of the adoption, as opposed to the custody decree which is subject to changing
circumstances, provides even further leave for a judge to consider a wide range
of factors in adoption in order to manipulate the test. 10 2 The practitioner should

" Id.; see also Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 375, 628 A.2d
1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (stating that "today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate

schooling, and supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever the source.
. ."). The Supreme Court of Vermont, via Judge Denise Johnson, went on to say that "a

child who also receives the love and nurture of even a single parent can be counted among
the blessed." Id. at 375, 628 A.2d at 1275. As a result, the court found that a child such
as found in this case who has all of this provided by two adults who are dedicated to him
as well as committed to each other should be permitted to remain with them. Id.
"Id.
See Appendix, In the Matter of the Adoption of a Minor Child, 662 A.2d 837 (D.C.
App. 1995) (stating sexual orientation relevant only where shown to adversely affect the

child).
'" See Bezio v. Patermaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980)
(quoting Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. 712, 719 (1979)).
101 The critical question of the welfare of the child is a combination of the parental
fitness and the best interest test. See Bezio, 381 Mass. at 576-77, 410 N.E.2d at 1214-15.
Neither test is properly applied without the other. Id. Massachusetts courts have stressed
that the life-style of a parent, by itself, is not a sufficient ground for "severing the natural
bond between a parent and a child." Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 503, 452 N.E.2d
293, 296 (1983). The lack of evidence demonstrating the adverse affect of the parent's
lifestyle on the child precludes a consideration of such issues. Id. at 504, 452 N.E.2d at
296. Although this argument logically extends from the custody situation here to an
adoption, the absence of a natural bond between the child and the adoptive parent has not
been addressed.
'0 See Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985). The Virginia Supreme
Court judicially recognized the underlying difference between custody and adoption in that
custody is subject to changing conditions and adoption decrees are final and irrevocable.
Id. The finality of the adoption decree would seem to evince a more compelling argument

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATEADVOCACY

[Vol. II

thus keep the court focussed on the welfare of the child through the petitioners'
commitment to the child and to each other, as well as their ability to provide for
the child. If petitioners' sexual orientation is brought into the analysis from
those opposing the petition, the practitioner should rely on the absence of harm
to the child from this behavior.

V. CONCLUSION
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court paved the way for
second-parent adoptions and provided standing for unmarried couples to adopt,
a court must find the best interests of the child standard met before granting such
petitions. The best interest standard is easily met where there is a second-parent
adoption in light of the benefits for a child to have a legal tie to the partner of the
natural parent, similar to a step-parent. Where there is a dual petition for
adoption by an unmarried couple with no biological tie to the child, however, the
benefits must be carefully outlined and potential adverse affects of sexual
orientation on the child addressed. The practitioner may use various methods
with which to prove the benefits to the child through a dual petition.
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has opened the door for a
dual petition through liberal interpretation of the adoption statute provided that
the court finds the child's best interests met. No studies have shown harm to a
child because of the sexual orientation of a parent, so any evidence of the
adverse effect of the sexual preference of an adoptive parent on a particular child
is skeptical at best. Establishment of a secure, permanent, and loving home life
for a child is a critical prerequisite for such a petition. After all, where so many
children are in need of a stable home and where so many children successfully
thrive under the care of gay and lesbian parents, perhaps more states should open
the pool of adoptive parents in order to truly promote the welfare of children.
Katherine Young

for the trial judge to support a consideration of sexual orientation and its potential effects
on the child.

